Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying? by Lemley, Mark A.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 105 Issue 7 
2007 
Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying? 
Mark A. Lemley 
Stanford Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Legal Writing and 
Research Commons, and the Litigation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525 (2007). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol105/iss7/10 
 
This Correspondence is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 




I. THE BENEFITS OF AN INDEPENDENT INVENTION DEFENSE... 1526
II. RISKS OF AN INDEPENDENT INVENTION DEFENSE ................. 1527
III. ALTERNATIVES TO INDEPENDENT INVENTION ....................... 1532
A . W illfulness .......... ............................................................ 1533
B . Prior User Rights ............................................................ 1533
C. Secondary Considerations of Nonobviousness ................ 1534
D . Injunctive Relief .............................................................. 1535
IV . C ONCLU SION .......................................................................... 1535
Patent infringement is a strict liability offense. Patent law gives patent
owners not just the right to prevent others from copying their ideas, but the
power to control the use of their idea--even by those who independently
develop a technology with no knowledge of the patent or the patentee. This
is a power that exists nowhere else in intellectual property (IP) or real prop-
erty law,' but it is a one that patentees have had, with rare exceptions, since
the inception of the Republic. In an important paper in the Michigan Law
Review, Samson Vermont seeks to change this, arguing that independent
invention should be a defense to patent infringement, just as it would be in
2copyright or trade secret cases. In an era in which both the Supreme Court
and Congress are showing a nearly unprecedented interest in patent law and
in which there is a general sense that the patent system is out of whack,
Vermont's idea may be one whose time has come.
t © 2007 Mark A. Lemley. All rights reserved.
* William H. Neukom Professor of Law, Stanford Law School; of counsel, Keker & Van
Nest LLP. Thanks to Rose Hagan, David McGowan, and Sam Vermont for comments on an earlier
draft.
I. The closest that other IP doctrines come to precluding independent development is in
trademark law, which precludes uses likely to confuse consumers even if the use was developed
independently. Whether the defendant adopted its mark intending to trade on the goodwill of the
plaintiff's mark is, however, the most important factor in determining confusion, so trademark law
certainly takes copying into account. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests
for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1628 (2006) (finding that the intent factor is the
most significant one in predicting the outcome of cases, creating "a nearly un-rebuttable presump-
tion of a likelihood of confusion").
2. Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 475 (2006). Carl Shapiro has recently made a similar argument in the economic literature.
Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, AM. EcON. REV., May 2006, at 92, 95.
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I. THE BENEFITS OF AN INDEPENDENT INVENTION DEFENSE
An independent invention defense has much to recommend it. The most
significant problem facing the patent system today is the rise of so-called
"patent trolls"--entities that do not manufacture products or transfer tech-
nology, but instead assert patents against successful companies that
independently develop and manufacture technology without knowledge of
those patents. Patent trolls have a number of tools at their disposal. They can
file continuation applications and modify their invention to track changes in
the defendant's product.3 They can threaten injunctive relief and seek dam-
ages out of proportion to the importance of the invention, allowing them to• 4
capture significantly more than just the value of their technical contribution.
In the information technology industries, it sometimes seems as though the
overwhelming majority of patent suits are not brought against people who
copied a technology, but against those who developed it independently.5
An independent invention defense would eliminate the troll problem. 6 It
also comports with our sense of equity. Those not schooled in patent law
would likely find it odd that a patent not only prevents the imitation of the
patentee's technology but also limits the ability of inventors to develop and
market their own technologies. And while an independent invention defense
would be new to U.S. patent law, it is hardly unprecedented. Not only do
other U.S. IP laws have such a defense, many other countries provide a
"prior user right defense," which, as we will see, is akin to independent in-
vention.'
3. For a discussion of this practice, see Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending
Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REv. 63, 76 (2004).
4. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L. REV.
(forthcoming May 2007).
5. Empirical evidence I am currently collecting suggests that in the computer and electron-
ics industries between 25% and 40% of all suits are filed by patent trolls, depending on how one
defines the term. There is no empirical evidence to quantify the number of cases that challenge
independent invention rather than copying, in significant part because under current law nothing
turns on the distinction. Judge Kimberly Moore's work has shown that 92% of patent suits allege
willfulness. Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR.
B.J. 227, 232 (2004). But under current law, patentees can claim willful infringement even by an
independent inventor; all the patentees must do is send the defendant a letter identifying the patent.
Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1085, 1090 (2003) (discussing this willfulness standard). So a willfulness claim, even if proven,
is no indication that the defendant copied from the patentee.
Jim Bessen and Mike Meurer have demonstrated that the more research and development a
company does, the more likely it is to get sued for patent infringement. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL
MEURER, Do PATENTS WORK? (forthcoming 2007). The most likely reason that this would be true is
if inadvertent infringement is a common occurrence. That infringement is inadvertent doesn't prove
independent invention-the infringer may have copied the invention from a non-patent disclosure
without realizing it was patented - but it makes independent invention more likely.
6. See Scott Baker & Doug Lichtman, Discouraging Patent Holdouts through
Reciprocal Commitment, 5-6 (2006), http://www.law.northwestem.edu/colloquium/aw-economics/
lichtman.pdf.
7. See, e.g., John Neukom, A Prior Use Right for the Community Patent Convention, 12
EUR. INTELL. PRop. REV. 165. 165-66 (1990).
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Vermont analyzes and dissects a number of common objections to an in-
dependent invention scheme for patent law. He responds persuasively, for
example, to the concern that people would exploit an independent invention
defense by falsifying evidence of independent invention. As he notes, out-
right fraud and perjury are rare in the patent system, even when more is at
8stake than proving an independent invention defense . If people won't lie
about when they invented to get patent rights, it seems unlikely they will lie
to get the lesser benefit of a defense to infringement.
The heart of Vermont's article is a response to the concern that an inde-
pendent invention defense will weaken patent rights and therefore
undermine incentives to invent. 9 Vermont uses Bayesian analysis to argue
that while an independent invention defense will weaken patent rights, it
will not significantly affect invention incentives. He points out that inde-
pendent invention will succeed as a defense only when an invention is made
by multiple people in near simultaneous fashion. Vermont's core insight is
that the fact that many people succeed in making an invention provides per-
suasive evidence that a monopoly right is an excessive reward because the
invention would have been made even without granting exclusive rights to
one of those inventors.' Since the point of patent law is to encourage inven-
tion, not to satisfy some moral entitlement," we should limit a patent
owner's rights-and therefore facilitate competition-in any case where a
stronger right isn't necessary to induce invention.
II. RISKS OF AN INDEPENDENT INVENTION DEFENSE
In short, Vermont offers persuasive justifications for an independent in-
vention defense. There are good reasons to think that the defense would
solve the problem of excessive litigation by patent trolls, and do so without
significant cost to innovation incentives. Nonetheless, I have concerns.
These concerns do not completely undermine the defense, but they are
8. Vermont, supra note 2, at 502.
9. This concern stems from the assumption that prices will be lower under duopoly than
under monopoly and that the incentives provided by duopoly competition will be less than they
would be under a truly exclusive right. Vermont and I both share this assumption, though it is worth
noting that economic theory is all over the map in predicting price under duopoly, with estimates
ranging from close to monopoly pricing to pure competitive pricing.
10. Vermont, supra note 2, at 497-500. Others have pointed out the social value of an inde-
pendent invention defense in increasing competition, a value that should be weighed against the risk
of reducing new inventions. E.g., Emeric Henry, Runner-up Patents: Is monopoly inevitable? (June
2006), http://www.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=922316. But Vermont is the first to note
that independent invention can itself provide valuable information about the likelihood of losing the
invention.
11. For a concise discussion of why moral entitlement claims are "hard to take seriously" in
patent law, see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575,
1597-99 (2003). For a few efforts to take these claims seriously, see, for example, A. Samuel Oddi,
Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents-The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
267, 275-77 (1996). Cf. Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 609, 620-29 (1993) (arguing that desert-based arguments for patent law are intui-
tively appealing, but do not necessarily justify the scope of current patent doctrine).
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significant enough that we should think carefully before making as signifi-
cant a change as Vermont recommends.
To begin, the stakes are quite high. While we tend to glorify the individ-
ual inventor who makes a significant leap forward, most of the important
inventions in U.S. history were made independently by multiple inventors,
or at least were built on a solid base of prior work by others. Vermont identi-
fies a number of such simultaneous inventions, including the light bulb, the
telephone, the telegraph, the telescope, and the integrated circuit. 2 We might
reasonably add to his list the steamboat, which was patented by different
inventors in different states; 3 the airplane, which was first patented by the
Wrights but independently developed and significantly improved upon by
Glenn Curtis and others; 4 the laser, which was the subject of patent applica-
tions by two different groups; 5 and polypropylene, which was the subject of• 6
a 30-year interference between competing inventors. The fact that so many
important advances in technology involved independent invention by multi-
ple parties underscores the significance of Vermont's argument. But it also
means that if Vermont is wrong, and an independent invention defense
would significantly reduce the incentives to innovate, the potential losses for
society are substantial.
Vermont counters that simultaneous invention is evidence that a right to
control not just copiers but independent inventors is excessive. Underlying
Vermont's reasoning is the idea that if the prospect of a huge reward tempts
many people to invest in research and they all succeed, the prospect of a
more modest reward will likely motivate at least one person to make the
same investment. And because the fact of independent invention demon-
strates that those remaining inventors are still likely to succeed, society will
still obtain the invention.
This reasoning makes considerable sense if the barrier to invention is the
uncertainty of research outcomes. Researchers will either think an outcome
is certain or that it isn't. If they expect an outcome is certain, they will an-
ticipate independent invention by others, but they will also believe that they
12. Vermont, supra note 2, at 478-79.
13. E.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF
AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 90-91 (1967); Frank D. Prager, The Steamboat Interfer-
ence: 1787-1803, 40 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 611, 640-41 (1958).
14. E.g., George Bittlingmayer, Property Rights, Progress, and the Aircraft Patent Agree-
ment, 31 J.L. & ECON. 227, 230-31 (1988); Herbert A. Johnson, The Wright Patent Wars and Early
American Aviation, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 21 (2004).
15. E.g., Gould v. Schawlow, 363 F.3d 908 (C.C.P.A. 1966). For a detailed discussion, see
NICK TAYLOR, LASER: THE INVENTOR, THE NOBEL LAUREATE, AND THE THIRTY-YEAR PATENT WAR
(2000).
16. The multi-party interference was declared by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interfer-
ences ("BPAI") on September 9, 1958. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. Montedison, S.p.A, 494 F. Supp.
370, 374 (D. Del. 1980). The BPAI issued its final opinion on priority on November 29, 1971. Id. at
375. The patent was filed on June 8, 1955, and issued on February 6, 1973. Id. at 374 n.5; U.S.
Patent No. 3,715,344 (filed June 8, 1955). The BPAI decision was appealed to the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware, id., and then to the Third Circuit, Standard Oil Co. (Ind.)
v. Montedison, S.p.A., 664 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
1528 [Vol. 105:1525
Patent Infringement
can reach the outcome and therefore that engaging in research will be rela-
tively cheap. 7 If, on the other hand, a researcher thinks a particular line of
inquiry is a long shot, she will not expect others to independently develop
the invention, and so won't worry as much about competition.
This reasoning breaks down if the barrier to research is not uncertainty
but cost. Suppose that potential researchers know that they can develop a
new drug for $500 million and that a full right to exclude will offer potential
rewards well in excess of the cost. If the researchers face competition from
one or more independent inventors, the researchers may not be able to re-
coup their investment. In that case, an independent invention defense may
undermine incentives to develop the invention at all. In theory, this case
shouldn't differ from the uncertainty case. If a researcher knows that lots of
others will race to a particular outcome, she should discount for her reduced
odds of being first. But in practice that is not how invention works. Re-
searchers may not know or suspect they are in a race. Even if they do,
people---even nominally rational corporations-systematically overinvest in
high-risk, high-reward activities. 8 This bias towards investment in winner-
take-all systems may be irrational, but it is an irrationality that arguably
benefits society by generating inventions with significant spillover bene-
fits.'9 In other words, one advantage of the current system is that inventors
invest more than they should rationally expect to recoup. Their investment
produces social benefits that significantly outweigh the actual expected
benefits to the patentee. Society benefits from the difference.
17. Indeed, one can strengthen Vermont's point here. The possibility of an independent in-
vention defense may actually increase research incentives among those who want to enter an
invention race but fear that they will not be the first to invent. Under current law, such research is
wasted. With an independent invention defense, the second to invent at least gets some reward for
their research-the ability to compete in marketing the invention.
18. FM. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 3 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss
et al. eds., 2001).
19. Economic evidence suggests that the social benefits of invention far outweigh the private
benefits appropriated from that invention. See, e.g., NESTER E. TERLECKYJ, EFFECTS OF R&D ON
THE PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH OF INDUSTRIES: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY (Nat'l Planning Ass'n,
Report No. 140, 1974); M. Ishaq Nadiri, Innovations and Technological Spillovers, (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4423, 1993); Edwin Mansfield et al., Social and Private Rates
of Return from Industrial Innovations, 91 Q.J. ECON. 221 (1977); Leo Sveikauskas, Technology
Inputs and Multifactor Productivity Growth, 63 REV. ECON. & STAT. 275 (1981); Akira Goto &
Kazuyuki Suzuki, R & D Capital, Rate of Return on R&D Investment and Spillover of R&D in
Japanese Manufacturing Industries, 71 REV. ECON. & STAT. 555 (1989); Jeffrey I. Bernstein & M.
Ishaq Nadiri, Interindustry R & D Spillovers, Rates of Return, and Production in High-Tech Indus-
tries, 78 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PRoc. 429 (1988); Frederick Scherer, Using Linked Patent and
R&D Data to Measure Interindustry Technology Flows, in R & D, PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY
417 (Z. Griliches ed., 1984); Jeffrey Bernstein & M. Ishaq Nadiri, Product Demand, Cost of Pro-
duction, Spillovers, and the Social Rate of Return to R&D (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 3625, 1991); see also Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D Spillovers, 94 SCAN-
DINAVIAN J. ECON. 29, 43 (Supp. 1992) ("In spite of [many] difficulties, there has been a significant
number of reasonably well done studies all pointing in the same direction: R&D spillovers are pre-
sent, their magnitude may be quite large, and social rates of return remain significantly above
private rates."). For a discussion of the implications of this issue for IP, see Brett M. Frischmann &
Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007).
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While I agree with Vermont that we can learn a great deal from the fact
of independent invention, I am not yet confident that an independent inven-
tion defense will have no undue effect on incentives. Eliminating the
significant holdup costs associated with patent trolls may be worth the risk,
but that will depend on how much invention we think an independent inven-
tion defense will in fact put at risk.
Complicating this difficult empirical question is the likelihood that the
effects of an independent invention defense would be different in different
20industries. Vermont's approach depends on the traditional economic justifi-
cation for patent rights-what I have called the "ex ante" incentive story.2'
In this story, [P is a necessary evil. If we don't need a particular reward in
order to encourage invention, we shouldn't distort the market by imposing
that reward. There are other "ex post" theories of invention, however. In
those theories, patent exclusivity is valuable not because of the incentives to
invent, but because control over the invention after it is made will permit
coordination of the development and use of the invention.22 For these "pros-
pect" theorists, central coordination is better than competition in
determining how an invention should be used. A prospect theorist would
likely oppose an independent invention right because the ability of a third
party to make use of the invention would interfere with that coordination
effort.
Vermont's analysis implicitly rejects prospect theory. As a general mat-
ter, I don't think that's a problem because I think the economic evidence is
quite strong that it should be rejected-that the market is better than central
planning by the inventor at determining how to make use of inventions once
they are made.23 But there may be some circumstances-and some indus-
tries-in which that is not true. In the pharmaceutical industry, for example,
it is reasonable to conclude that the most significant expense and uncertainty
associated with innovation is not the act of inventing a drug, but the efforts
to develop and test that drug to prove to the FDA that it is safe and effective.
Some argue that the same is true of many university inventions-that they
are at such an early stage that they will languish unless the university can
transfer patent rights to private companies who will undertake develop-
20. See generally Burk & Lemley, supra note 11, at 1580-95 (demonstrating the ways in
which different industries experience the patent system differently).
21. Mark A. Lemley, E Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 129, 130 (2004).
22. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 275-80 (1977); F Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707-12 (2001). For more critical but not entirely negative as-
sessments, see, for example, Michael Abramowicz, The Problem of Patent Underdevelopment 3-8
(The George Washington Univ. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 179, 2005)
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=873473; John E Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory
of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439,443-47 (2004).
23. For my detailed defense of that argument, see, for example, Lemley, supra note 21, at




ment.24 In these industries, patent owners may need the power associated
with a right of complete exclusion not just to encourage invention but to
ensure that the inventor invests the resources to take the idea from invention
through development to marketability. If generic pharmaceutical companies
could compete with patent owners from day one by independently develop-
ing the drug,2 the incentives to engage in pioneering pharmaceutical
26innovation would change significantly, and not for the better. An independ-
ent invention defense is almost certainly a good idea in the information
technology industries, but if it is a bad idea in other industries, we need to
think carefully about whether and how the defense should be implemented.
Related to the potential effects on post-invention investment are the ef-
fects that an independent invention defense will have on markets for patents.
An independent invention defense will significantly change any possible
market for patent rights. It is much easier to sell a right of absolute exclu-
sion than a right of control that is potentially defeasible based on
information-the fact of independent invention-that the patentee is
unlikely to have at the time of the sale. If an inventor obtains a patent under
current law, he can sell his patent to others who are better able to commer-
cialize it because he can guarantee them exclusivity-at least if the patent is
valid2 7 In comparison, it is harder (though admittedly not impossible) to sell
trade secrets, in part because there is no guarantee that the buyer will• • 28
have any exclusivity. For patents with an independent invention
24. This is the view that underlies the Bayh-Dole Act encouraging university patenting. See
35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212; see also Chester G. Moore, Killing the Bayh-Dole Act's Golden Goose, 8
TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 151, 155-57 (2006). For a more negative view of the value of pat-
ents in commercializing university inventions, see DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND
INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE
BAYH-DOLE AcT IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2004).
25. Currently these companies do not independently develop their drugs, but rather deliber-
ately set out to make drugs bioequivalent to the ones the patent owner sells. But one can imagine the
development of an industry of generic drug design, producing a wide range of chemical compounds
and waiting to see which compounds happen to match drugs that a patentee has found a medical use
for.
26. To be sure, pharmaceutical companies receive rights to exclude others from the FDA, not
just from the patent laws. E.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity and Information
Dissemination: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 477, 481-84 (2003). The FDA approval process can itself impose costs on generic developers,
just as it does on first movers. Those costs can effectively substitute for patent protection. William
E. Ridgway, Note, Realizing Two-Tiered Innovation Policy Through Drug Regulation, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 1221, 1236-39 (2006). It is when the regulatory cost structure is asymmetric, as it is under
current law, that some form of exclusivity becomes important. If patent law did not provide that
exclusivity to pharmaceutical developers, FDA market exclusivity would have to pick up the slack.
27. This is a significant limitation. Patents are probabilistic rights to begin with, so patent
owners can't really "guarantee" anything.
28. People do regularly transfer copyrights despite the existence of an independent invention
defense in copyright law. But I think patents are much more like trade secrets than copyrights in this
respect. The value of a copyright resides in the expression and not in the idea expressed. In contrast,
it is the idea behind a patent or a trade secret that is valuable, and in many cases it is unlikely to
matter how that idea is implemented. In copyright, anyone who buys an idea buys it subject to the
risk that one or more competitors will have rights to use all the value of that idea. Indeed, in circum-
stances where it is only the idea of a copyrighted work that owners want to transfer, as is the case
with movie scripts, the fact that others can implement the idea in their own way without fear of
1531May 2007]
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defense, the problem may be greater still because the patentee will have
publicly disclosed the invention. Commercializers will be less likely to pur-
chase rights to patents under an independent invention system because they
won't know if they are buying exclusivity or just the right to participate in a
duopoly or a triopoly. At the least they may delay any such purchase-and
therefore slow commercialization-to see if independent developers surface.
Whether this is a problem depends on whether the development of a
market for patent rights divorced from products or know-how is in fact a
good thing. Selling or exclusively licensing patents can improve economic
efficiency by allowing an inventor to transfer her rights to someone who is• • 29
in a better position to commercialize the invention. But selling patents can
also put them in the hands of patent trolls who use those patents to hold up
independent inventors that have actually commercialized the technology.
The underlying question is an empirical one: do patent licenses in fact in-
volve socially beneficial technology transfer, or do they primarily involve
the sales of a right to litigate? If the former, we should be worried that a
change in the law that will stunt the marketability of patents will also inter-
fere with the valuable dissemination of information. If the latter, then the
obstruction of such sales may be a feature of Vermont's proposal, not a bug.
Here too the answer may differ by industry, though we simply don't know• 30
enough about markets for technology to begin to answer the question.
Il. ALTERNATIVES TO INDEPENDENT INVENTION
In short, an independent invention defense could eliminate a great deal
of inefficient behavior by those who abuse the patent litigation system. As
Vermont's analysis shows, the defense offers the prospect of doing so at
little or no cost to innovation incentives. At the same time, an independent
invention defense might interfere with incentives to develop, transfer, or
commercialize the invention after it was made, and in rare circumstances it
might also interfere with incentives to invest in research. We must be careful
in balancing these effects, recognizing both how little we know about the
economics of patents and how the ultimate economic calculus may vary for
liability-unless they see the script-makes the development of a market for movie scripts virtually
impossible. For a discussion of this problem, see, for example, ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 880-83 (4th ed. 2006).
29. See, e.g., DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 2.3 (1995) (Licensing ... can facilitate integration
of the licensed property with complementary factors of production. This integration can lead to
more efficient exploitation of the intellectual property, benefiting consumers .... [L]icensing also
can increase the incentive for [IP] creation and thus promote greater investment in research and
development.").
30. For a useful summary of what we do know, see ASHIsH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR
TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY (2001). Judge
Kimberly Moore's work has found that patents that are litigated are much more likely to be trans-
ferred before litigation. See Kimberly A. Moore, Populism and Patents, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007). This may be evidence of the troll hypothesis, but it might also simply be con-
sistent with the idea that valuable patents are more likely to be litigated. See John R. Allison et al.,
Valuable Patents, 92 GEo. L.J. 435, 437-38 (2004).
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different industries. This isn't a reason to reject Vermont's proposal, much
less his analysis. But it is a reason to proceed with care.
In light of this, let me suggest four ways that we could take advantage of
Vermont's insights without moving all the way to an independent invention
system.
A. Willfulness
First, we could reform our standard for willful infringement to incorpo-
rate an independent development defense. Even if there turn out to be good
reasons to find independent developers to be patent infringers, it makes little
sense to describe someone who independently invents as a "willful in-
fringer."'" As I have suggested elsewhere, willfulness should be defined
instead as copying the technology from the patent owner, whether or not the
copier was aware that the technology was patented.32 Doing so will distin-
guish independent inventors from copiers, making treble damages available
only against the latter.
Vermont worries that this will encourage too much patent racing.33 I am
less concerned. First, as Vermont notes elsewhere, changes in willfulness are
unlikely to move incentives to invent much in any direction, except at the
margins. Second, I am less persuaded than he that patent races are bad.
While reinvention does involve some duplication of research, research is not
always or even usually a fungible commodity. Multiple lines of research
attacking the same problem may lead to different inventions, each of which
is valuable to society. It may also cause the racers to reach the finish line
faster, with significant social benefits . 4 Finally, as I have explained else-
where, the willfulness change would encourage scientists to read patents,
which would eliminate a significant inefficiency in the nascent market for
patents.35
B. Prior User Rights
Second, we could adopt a limited form of independent invention defense
36in the form of a prior user right. Under this approach, which has been
31. On willful infringement, see Knorr-Bremse Systeme v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (en banc).
32. See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 5, at 1116-21.
33. Samson Vermont, The Angel is in the Big Picture: A Response to Lemley, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 1537 (2007).
34. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439
(2004).
35. See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 5, at 1121.
36. For suggestions that the U.S. should adopt a prior user rights system, see, for example,
Oversight Hearings on Prior User Rights Before the Subcomm. On Intellectual Property and Judi-
cial Administration of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 32-45 (1995) (statement of
Robert P. Merges, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law); Kyla L. Harriel, Prior User
Rights in a First-to-Invent Patent System: Why Not?, 36 IDEA 543 (1996).
1533May 2007]
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adopted in Europe and has been proposed in recent U.S. patent reform legis-
lation,37 independent invention becomes a defense, but only if the
independent invention is made and commercialized sufficiently early in the
process, such as before the patentee files its application. Indeed, Vermont
himself endorses an independent invention defense that is similarly limited,
one that applies only if the independent inventor invents before the invention
is published.3' Doing so avoids some of the problems that might plague a
broader independent invention right. Specifically, this limited approach
makes it very difficult to game the system by falsifying independent inven-
tion. It also makes it easier to sell at least some patents because everyone
involved will know fairly early on if an independent inventor will claim in-
tervening rights. That may be enough to tip the scales in favor of an
independent invention defense. But a prior user right would be more limited
still, since it would protect not those who engage in the mere act of inde-
pendent invention but only those who take steps to commercialize the
invention before the critical date. That limitation should eliminate any worry
in the pharmaceutical industry, where generic companies will not be able to
commercialize an invention before the patentee without seeking FDA ap-
proval for a new drug. Alternatively, if even a prior user right would be too
threatening to the pharmaceutical or biotechnology industries, the right-
which already exists in U.S. law for business method patents 9-- could be
expanded to other information technology industries, where we can be more
confident that the benefits outweigh the costs.
C. Secondary Considerations of Nonobviousness
Third, we might internalize the lessons of Vermont's Bayesian analysis
in a different way, by taking seriously the relevance of simultaneous inven-
tion as a secondary consideration in the obviousness analysis. Under current
law, courts considering whether an invention is obvious are free to consider
a variety of external market factors, almost all of which are found to favor
patentability. Only one-simultaneous invention by others-is considered
evidence that the invention shouldn't be patentable, and the Federal Circuit
has minimized the significance of that factor.4° If Vermont is right that si-
multaneous invention is evidence that patent protection may be unnecessary,
perhaps we should give this factor more significance in the obviousness
analysis. Doing so is in one sense a more radical proposal than Vermont's. It
would not just create a defense to infringement for independent inventors; it
would invalidate some patents altogether.4' At the same time, simultaneous
37. See, e.g., S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
38. See Vermont, supra note 2, at 484 (describing prior user rights as consistent with his
"main argument").
39. 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(3) (2000).
40. See, e.g., Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1380 n.4 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
41. See Vermont, supra note 33, at 1542 (worrying that this will reduce incentives too much).
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invention is just one factor among many in the obviousness analysis. Courts
can continue to engage in a case-specific analysis of all the factors in order
to determine whether a patent is necessary given the existence of simultane-
ous invention. And for inventions that do seem obvious once we take
Bayesian inference into account, rejecting the patent altogether might well
be appropriate.
D. Injunctive Relief
Finally, we might take account of independent invention in setting the
remedy for patent infringement. The normal remedy for patent infringement
is an injunction. While eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C.42 made it clear
that patentees are not automatically entitled to injunctions, it did not change
the general status of patent law as a property rule. But while an injunction
against a copier seems perfectly equitable, an injunction against an inde-
pendent developer can render significant irreversible investments by the
defendant worthless. One might address this situation by refusing injunctive
relief (and other remedies) altogether, as Vermont suggests. An alternative
would be to grant injunctive relief against both copiers and independent de-
velopers, but to condition the grant of an injunction against an independent
developer on the payment of a bond designed to compensate the defendant
for its now-worthless investment. Such a bond corresponds to an approach
identified by Calabresi and Melamed as one possible remedy for invasion of
a legal right-a property entitlement in the patent owner coupled with a li-• 41
ability rule right in the accused infringer. Patentees will likely object to the
idea of having to pay infringers,4 but presumably they will object less than
they would to an independent invention defense. At a minimum, courts
could take independent invention into account in deciding whether to grant
preliminary injunctions, which are subject to significantly more skepticism
in the Federal Circuit than permanent injunctions traditionally have been.
IV. CONCLUSION
Vermont's analysis offers reason to believe that patent law, like other IP
rights, should incorporate an independent invention defense. While he is
likely correct that doing so will not significantly interfere with innovation
incentives, there is a danger that such a defense will interfere with incentives
to commercialize or market patent rights. In limited circumstances, this in-
terference may be a significant problem. We should think carefully about
42. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
43. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1120 (1972).
44. In the pharmaceutical industry, patentees already pay competitors to exit the market with
some frequency as part of an effort to cartelize the market through settlement. See, e.g., HERBERT
HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST § 7.4(e) (perm. ed., supp. 2007) (discussing such agree-
ments in detail); Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement As a
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (2006) (same).
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whether the benefits of an independent invention defense are worth the po-
tential costs, and about whether there are alternatives that can draw on
Vermont's insights without creating risks to the incentive structure of the
patent system.
